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Rights, Bodies and the Law: Towards a Feminist Ethics of Justice 
Nivedita Menon a 
It is generally assumed that law should be the institutionalised 
pursuit of justice. While it is accepted that there would always be 
an excess of justice which cannot be captured by the law, counter- 
hegemonic political practices reflect the belief that however 
weakly, incompletely or unwillingly, the processes of the law can 
be forced to reflect the ideal of justice. 
The questions this paper addresses are - does law have the 
capacity to pursue justice, and more fundamentally, can "justice" 
be conceived of in a universal sense as suggested for example, by 
the term "social justice". Both questions seem to require a 
negative answer. 
The first assumes that power, the unequal dynamics of which 
constitute injustice, is juridicially derived. But as Foucault 
points out, while many of the juridical forms of power continue to 
persist, these have "gradually been penetrated by quite new 
mechanisms of power that are probably irreducible to the 
representation of the law ... We have engaged for centuries in a type 
of society in which the juridical is increasingly incapable of 
coding power, of serving as its system of representation" 
(1984:89). This is why, I would argue, our attempts to transform 
power relations through law tend rather, to resediment these 
relations and to reassert dominant values. 
The second question can be addressed in the following way. In 
the course of this paper I will attempt to displace the assumption 
underlying understandings of rights, that these are universal and 
based on a generally accepted moral order. I argue rather, that 
rights come into being within specific sets of shared norms of 
justice and equality. However, legal discourse, through which 
rights are sought to be institutionalised, is marked by the 
movement towards certainty and exactitude. What are the 
implications for the liberatory potential of rights once their 
meaning is fixed by law ? If, as I seek to establish, rights are 
constituted by the values derived from specific moral universes, 
there is a singularity to justice, a uniqueness which as Derrida 
puts it, must always concern "individuals, irreplaceable groups and 
lives, the other or myself as the other in a unique situation" 
(1990:949. Emphasis in original). This uniqueness however, is at 
odds with law, which must take a general form, as norm and as rule. 
In Derrida's understanding of justice, the very condition of 
justice is that one must address oneself to the other in the 
language of the other. There is violence involved in judging 
persons in an idiom they do not share, perhaps even understand. But 
this violence is obscured by the appeal to "justice" as a universal 
value, as to a third party "who suspends the unilaterality or 
singularity of the idioms" (1990:955). Derrida emphasises that to 
recognize this is not to abdicate before the question of justice or 
to deny the opposition between just and unjust. Rather, it involves 
a responsibility to a "historical and interpretative memory" 
(1990:955). That is, to recall the history, the origin and 
subsequent direction, of concepts of justice and the law. In this 
way we would be desedimenting the values embedded in the idea of 
justice as a universal concept. These values have assumed the 
status of natural presuppositions and the violence of the moment of 
their imposition has been rendered invisible through a kind of 
historical amnesia. To interrogate points of origin constantly, to 
question the grounds of the norms which underlie notions of justice 
at historically specific moments, is not to surrender an interest 
in justice. On the contrary, it "hyperbolically raises the stakes 
of exacting justice" (1990:955) . 
The answer then, to the second question that this paper 
engages with is that the achievement of justice in a universal 
sense is an impossibility. At particular historical moments 
"justice" is constituted by specific moral visions, but the 
discourse of the law is predicated upon the assumption that justice 
can be attained once and for all by the fixing of identity and 
meaning. The meaning delivered by law as the just one then gets 
articulated in complex ways with other discourses constituting 
identity, and tends to sediment dominant and oppressive 
possibilites rather than marginal and emancipatory ones. 
I will engage with the two questions that I have outlined 
above, through an examination of the issues of abortion and sexual 
violence. Unproblematized notions of "body" and "self" are 
embedded in feminist discourse on these two issues. The 
understanding is that "the body" is a natural and physical object 
and that "sexn is a phenomenon which exists prior to all discourse, 
simply distinguishable from other kinds of human interaction. 
However, what we need to take on board in our struggle to 
develop a feminist sense of self is that "the body" and "sexn are 
not "natural" but produced by discourses. This is not to deny their 
"reality" but to question the assumption that this "reality" can be 
accessible outside of particular contexts. It would then become 
necessary to rethink the attempt to universalise one particular 
"reality" through law. 
Legal discourse produces the "body" as an object that has to 
be one or the other of a series of binary oppositions - 
male/female, healthy/diseased, heterosexual/homosexual. On the 
other hand, the experience of "self" and "body" validated by 
feminism as "real" acquires meaning precisely through an interplay 
of contexts, a movement that is halted by the rigid codifications 
required by legal discourse. The issues of abortion and sexual 
violence in particular, cast women as "bodiesn for both feminist 
and legal discourse. An examination of these issues would therefore 
be fruitful in terms of the questions raised above. 
Questioning Rights 
Both at a conceptual as well as at a political level, Rights and 
Law are quite distinctly connected. On the one hand, a social 
movement operating in the realm of law is constrained to use the 
language of rights because legal discourse is animated by the 
weighing of competing rights. In other words, to enter into the 
realm of law, rights-talk becomes obligatory. On the other hand, 
when a social movement makes claims based on rights, at some level 
these claims are predicated on the assumption that these rights 
should be protected by law. The language of rights thus tends to 
privilege the sphere of the state and its institutions. 
We can trace the evolution of the understanding of rights from 
the first systematic development of the concept in ancient Rome, 
when rights were created by the law. For Roman jurists rights, law 
and justice were inseparable, and the law was considered to be an 
expression of the community's conception of justice. Nevertheless 
rights did not imply absolute control, nor were they unlimited in 
scope. Rights operated in the realm of civil society, not in the 
realm of the state or the family, and governed relationships 
between individuals, not between individuals and the state. During 
i%e centuries of feudalism in Europe, righcs continued to be 
conceived of in much the same way, with both individuals as well as 
communities and groups being the.bearers of rights. Indeed, the 
"individual" was not clearly demarcated from his community, work or 
land. The process of individuation which was to be both empowering 
as well as severely alienating, began later. Moreover, rights were 
derived from customs and traditions as well as from law, and all 
sources of rights had equal validity. 
Fron the seventeenth century rights began to be seen as 
inhering in individuals, rather than in groups or communities. This 
individual was detached from his social context and conceived of as 
constituted by the limits of his body. The Individual as the bearer 
of rights was also male, as feminist critiques have pointed out, 
for male bodies were considered perfect, being clearly bounded. 
Female bodies were seen as permeable, subject to cyclical changes 
and with unlimitable boundaries. They could never be the rational, 
indivisible, unambiguous individual (Landes 1988). 
The source of rights shifted to the civil law, with customs, 
traditions and usages being gradually marginalised. Most 
significantly, the scope of rights changed radically at this time. 
The natural world was no longer part of a whole in which human 
beings acquire their sense of self. Rather, it was external and 
alien to the individual who was to master it and tame it to his 
ends. This meant that everything in the external world was an 
object over which men could have rights. Not only the external 
world, but each of his capacities became quantifiable and alienable 
while at the same time, man had somehow to be considered separable 
from his capacities so that his "self" could remain "his" even as 
he sold or alienated aspects of himself. Man's "self" then, was 
seen to reside in his capacity to choose, and as long as he chose 
freely, he was an autonomous individual, regardless of the ways in 
which his ability to choose was constrained (Parikh 1987:s-9). 
We see then, that the idea of individuals as bearers of rights 
in their own capacities is barely four hundred years old. These 
centuries have seen the expansion of democratic rights to more and 
more sections of people, and the discourse of rights has empowered 
social movements of different kinds. Thus, while Marxists have 
critiqued "rights" as juridical conceptions which mask substantial 
inequality, they have argued that the rights themselves are not 
illusions. The formal recognition by the doctrine of equal rights 
of the equal dignity of all human beings, embodies what Poulantzas 
calls the "real rights of the dominated classesn, which are the " 
saterial concessions imposed on the dominant classes by popular 
struggle" ( Poulantzas 1978:84). The struggle then, is to transform 
these empty juridical rights into real rights by transforming the 
structural conditions which disesnpower the labouring classes. 
Rights are considered to have a powerful emancipatory potential, 
both at the level of rhetoric and symbol as well as substantively, 
with the revolutionary transformation of material conditions. 
Christine Sypnowich argues that any worthwhile socialist society 
would require legal institutions to adjudicate disputes between 
socialist citizens and between citizen and community. A socialist 
jurisprudence must draw from the liberal tradition, she holds, and 
herself using Ronald Dworkin's phrase, argues that it must retrieve 
the idea of the individual with rights which "trump" society's 
policies (Sypnowich 1992:86-87). Thus Marxist critiques attack the 
illusory nature of rights in capitalist society, not the 
understanding that the concept of "rights" has emancipatory 
gotential. 
A powerful and influential critique of rights, law and the 
state has come from Catharine MacKinnon who argues that liberalism 
supports state intervention on behalf of women as abstract persons 
'with abstract rights while in reality "the state is male in the 
feminist sense." Abstract rights only "authorise the male 
experience of the world." As a result, she holds, feminist 
understandings of the world have been "schizoid" - on the one hand 
recognizing the world as patriarchal and oppressive, and on the 
other, turning to the law to make the law less sexist. She sees the 
state as embodying and ensuring male control over female sexuality 
even while it juridically prohibits excesses. In fact the legal 
prohibition of and controls over pornography and prostitution are 
meant to enhance their eroticism - "if part of the kick of 
pornography involves eroticising the putatively prohibited, 
pornography law will putatively prohibit pornography enough to 
maintain its desirability without making it unavailable or truly 
illegitimate" (MacKinnon 1983:643-644). MacKinnon's critique'of the 
law and her understanding of gender as dominance of women by men 
(MacKinnon 1987:32-45) has certainly served the purpose of 
radically questioning the myth of the neutrality of the law which 
continues to have a powerful hold over the feminist imagination. 
Yet MacKinnon herself makes the law the focus of her feminist 
politics in the USA. She has been the pioneer of legislation 
.-against sexual harrassment and pornography, formulated in terms of 
employment rights and civil rights respectively (See MacKinnon 
1987:103-116, 163-197). Her critique of abstract rights is based on 
an understanding of "the intractability of maleness as a form of 
dominance" ( MacKinnon 1983:636) which leaves no space for women 
let alone for feminist politics. If male dominance is so dauntingly 
seamless then indeed, "it may be easier to change biology than 
society" as she gloomily concludes (MacKinnon 1983:636). But in 
that case, where is the feminist critique of MacKinnon herself 
generated ? Clearly there cannot be a perfect fit between the 
"intention" of male dominance as MacKinnon sees it, and its effect. 
Ultimately, MacKinnon's rejection of abstract rights and their 
illusoriness in an overarching system of male dominance from which 
nothing escapes, can only leave feminist politics in a state of 
paralysis. Given her.analysis, it is impossible to justify or 
understand her legal activism, where she continues to expect to be 
able to force "women's experience" into the law. It would seem that 
so state-focused has our vision of political transformation become, 
that the most radical critiques of the state and its institutions 
end up merely realigning themselves once again on its territory. 
This is particularly characteristic of analyses which suggest 
that the purposes of justice would be served better by stressing 
the relative importance of "needs" as compared to "rights". Upendra 
Baxi,counterposing human rights to basic human needs, problematizes 
the liberal conception of rights in a situation of mass poverty. He 
argues that the notion of Human Rights must be fused into a 
 isc cuss ion of developmental processes - development in the sense of 
value for human dignity, both in an economic as well as in a 
political sense. He recognizes that needs are socio-genic and 
culture-specific, and therefore that questions will arise about the 
hierarchy of needs, who determines this hierarchy, and the conflict 
between human rights and needs. Nevertheless he holds that the 
needs-aproach is still the most just way of understanding the 
possibilities of a just society. However, Baxi's analysis 
continues to focus on the State as the agent of change. For 
instance, he asks, "Should not continued drought or famine in one 
state in India ... justify a nation-wide ban on the conspicuous 
consumption of food on social events ?"  (Baxi 1987:190-95). There 
is an inability here to come to terms with the State and the law as 
deeply implicated in the processes which make famines, uneven 
development, and enclaves of wealth intrinsic parts of the Indian 
system. 
Nancy Fraser believes that needs-claims can balance the 
competing claims of mutual responsibility and individual rights 
even though there exists the danger of playing into the hands of 
conservatives.who prefer to distribute aid as a matter of need 
rather than right precisely to avoid any assumption of entitlement. 
Since her analysis is geared towards retrieving aspects of the 
Welfare State while critiquing its paternalism and androcentrism, 
she is quite unambiguously state-focused. Moreover she concludes by 
' arguinS that "justified needs claims" must be translated into 
social rights. This suggests a hierarchy - that needs'must graduate 
into rights if they are to be taken seriously. It would seem then, 
that she sees needs-claims not as an improvement on rights-claims 
but merely as a preliminary stage to making rights-claims (Fraser 
1989: 182-183) . 
The only arguments that consistently reject the state-centric 
implications of "rights" and "law" come from a position that 
rejects individualism, but at the cost of valoritiag "the 
community". Scholars of the Critical Legal Studies (CLS) Movement 
hold that rights discourse magnifies social antagonism by pitting 
one set of rights against another and question whether it can 
facilitate social reconstruction. Rather they urge recognition of 
consensus building mechanisms within the community. Such an 
understanding.obscures the fact that "the community" is marked by 
exclusion along the axes of caste, gender, class and so on. "Social 
antagonism" can only be rendered invisible, not obliterated. 
Feminists in particular, find this position deeply problematic 
because the CLS critque of individualism instals the family as 
beyond justice, as a sphere embodying love, generosity and 
unselfishness, qualities that are above justice.(l) This 
mystification of the family as a sphere of love and harmony has 
been one of the primary foci of feminist critique over the last 
three decades. The family has.been identified as one of the primary 
sites of oppression for women, based on inequality and injustice 
which are gender-based. If the rejection of rights as 
individualistic entails reinstating the family as moral 
community,clearly it would be self-defeating for feminism. 
Feminists therefore, have attempted to redefine rights so that 
they need not be understood as purely individualist. For example, 
Martha Minow and Nancy Fraser have both tried to conceptualise 
rights so that they embody connectedness between autonomy and 
responsibility (Minow 1985a, 1985b, 1983, discussed in Schneider 
1991:311; Fraser 1989:312-316). Similarly, Elizabeth Schneider 
argues that the experience of the women's movement has shown that 
a clain of right is a moral claim about how human beings should act 
towards one another. 
Analyses of this kind, which attempt to rescue the 
emancipatory impulse'of the rights discourse from its 
individualistic thrust, can only do so by introducing the dimension 
of morality. 
The Moral Basis of Rights 
The idea that there are rights sanctioned by a moral orderwhether 
or not they have legal existence is not a new one (Weinreb 1991; 
Feinberg 1992). Agnes Heller for example, argues that rigare 
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Nancy Fraser puts it, rights talk is not necessarily 
individualistic and androcentric. It becomes so "only when 
societies establish the wrong rights, for example when the 
(putative) right to private property is allowed to trump other, 
social rights" (Fraser 1989:183, emphasis in original). 
Clearly, what one "ought" to do, or what constitutes a "moral" 
action, makes sense only within shared sets of understandings on 
"justice", "equality" and so on. Thus, rights are constituted by 
shared moral boundaries. What happens to them in the realm of legal 
discourse? Appeals to the law are made on the assumption that 
rights are self-evident, universally comprehended and universally 
appl'icable, but some slippage in meaning takes place once they are 
in the legal arena where diverse discourses of rights converge. 
That is, what appears to be a right empowering women within 
feminist discourse can have entirely the contrary effect once it is 
materialised in the legal realm. The manner in which this 
transposition takes place will be explored with reference to the 
issues of rape and abortion in later sections. 
Elizabeth Kingdom's feminist critique of rights questions the 
desirability of generalizing on a whole range of issues grouped 
together under the heading of "women's rights". She urges instead 
that specific legislations be analysed from both "feminist" and 
"socialist" perspectives. She argues that this model allows for a 
more complex analysis of the issues covered by "women's rights". 
She takes up as an instance, the case of protective legislation 
(restrictions on the employment of women in hazardous work, night 
work, overtime, and so on), in which the protection of women's 
rights is inseparable from the struggle to improve working 
conditions for both men and women (1991:26-45). 
While Kingdom recognizes the problematic nature of "women's 
rights", she fails to take her analysis far enough by 
problemtizing the notion of "rights" itself. As a result, she 
assumes that it would always be possible to apply a "feminist" or 
a "socialist" understanding to specific legislations without the 
possibility of conflict between the two. For instance, the example 
she suggests, that of protective legislation, has been the focus of 
other socialist-feminist studies as exemplifying the conflict 
within the working class between the rights of male and female 
workers (Alexander 1976; Barrett 1984). Michele Barrett, discussing 
the position taken by British trade unions on protective 
legislation, that such measures should be retained, argues that 
this was a deliberate strategy to reduce competition for male 
workers. She notes that such legislation was introduced in areas of 
competition rather than in all areas of work (1984:171). 
A more thoroughgoing feminist critique of rights is provided 
by Carol Smart (1989) . She holds that first-wave feminists needed 
the concept of equal rights to fight against legally imposed 
impediments but that in the late twentieth century , while law 
remains oppressive of women, it no longer takes the form of denial 
of formal rights reserved for men. Continuing the demand for formal 
rights now is problematic. She suggests that "the rhetoric of 
rights has become exhausted, and may even be detrimental" 
(1989:139). Rights can be appropriated by the more powerful, for 
example, the Sex Discrimination Act may be used as much by men as 
by women, to challege affirmative action for women. She also points 
out that rights are often formulated to deal with a. social wrong, 
but in practice become focused on the individual who must prove 
c5at her rights have been violated. Any redress too, will affect 
only that particular woman (1989:145). 
Posing a problem in terms of rights simply transposes that 
problem into one that is defined as having a legal solution. While 
accepting that rights do amount to "legal and political power 
resources", Smart holds that the value of these resources seems to 
be ascertainable more in terms of the losses if such rights 
diminish, than in terms of gains if they are sustained (1989: 143) . 
This distinction that Smart makes is crucial to developing any 
critique .of rights, for it forces a confrontation of the fact that 
while the existence of a given right does not guarantee its 
realisation, its denial will negatively affect the people who had 
held that right. 
However, Smart's critique remains in the terrain of the state, 
for she urges in place of rights, a reformulation of "demands" 
grounded in "women's experiences" rather than in "abstract notions 
like rights" (1989:159). What form will these "demands" take and on 
whom will they be made? It is not clear how Smart's "demands" will 
differ' from "rights" after all. Moreover-the formulation of . 
rights-as-abstract versus experience-as-concrete is misleading. We 
have seen how rights are derived precisely from within a universe 
of shared "experiences". The difference between "rights" and 
"experience" cannot be sustained. 
The next section will examine the manner in which legal 
discourse operates,seeking certainty and exactitude and bringing to 
a halt the play of meaning and contexts which give rise to rights. 
- 
.- - -- Legal Discourse and the Fixing of Meaning 
--. .- In India the understanding of "law" was fundamentally changed with 
- -- . - . the British conquest - Legality replaced Authority. Whereas in the 
.--- - - classical system the judgement had no other object but to put an 
end to the dispute, it now began to constitute a precedent, a 
source of law. Even in the mediaeval period, there was great 
flexibility in the attachment of particular regions to one or the 
..- other school: -of interpretation. Sastric law was as likely to modify 
. - -  - -. its principles to match local custom as custom was, in deference to 
. - Sastric law. Islamic law too, was based on revelation as Dharma 
was, and in neither were decisions of the court the source of law. 
. -  In both, interpretation and custom had the same importance (Altekar 
1952; Lingat 1973; Baxi 1986). (2) 
Under the British system the judge fixed interpretation once 
and for all, and further development of the law could take place 
only through cases. Even where custom,was accepted as prevailing 
over Sastric law, it was fixed as legal rule. Once identified, 
"custom" was understood to be fixed, and rigidly codified. Thus, 
the dynamic interplay between custom and Sastric law was halted. 
Upendra Baxi argues that it .is with "ascendant capitalism and its 
Siamese twin colonialism" that the state appropriated to itself the 
legitimacy of being the sole source of law. All other forms of 
dispensing justice then began to be seen as inferior - these became 
designated as "custom", "community justice" or "unofficial 
adjudication". He holds that these should instead be called 
"non-state legal systems" because to deny them the status of law is 
to accept the colonial devaluing of indigenous institutions (Baxi 
- 1992:251-252). 
. However modern legal systems are marked by "a quest 
for ... certainty, consistency and uniformity", as Baxi himself 
points out elsewhere (Baxi 1986. Emphasis in original). This is not 
characteristic of pre-colonial indigenous justice-dispensing 
institutions, and the universal use of "lawn to refer to all forms 
of "prescriptions, prohibitions, punishments" (Baxi 1992 : 251) would 
blur this crucial distinction. Baxi does not consider the goals of 
'certainty and uniformity to be desirable and urges in fact, 
departures from them to ensure "legal growth". However, he does not 
address the question of how such departures are to be effected. The 
legitimacy of the law rests on the concept of Rule of Law, that is, 
zhe due observance of the procedures prescribed for making a valid 
decision. Thus when Ronald Dworkin questions the rationalist and 
positivist certainties of law, affirming law rather, as 
interpretation and meaning, he is clear that such interpretation 
has to follow "the injunctions of a grammar of principles". Such 
principles are drawn from the moral ideals of a subject assumed to 
be universal (See discussion in Douzinas et a1 1991:24-30). 
Clearly, any attempt to build into the law, an openness to 
multivalence, would have to be institutionalised if it is to be 
legitimate. The paradoxical nature of this formulation itself 
points to its impossibility. Without such institutionalisation, 
departures from consistency and,uniformity can only be at the whim 
of individual judges. 
Such departures are in fact, precisely the focus of one school 
of feminist critique of the law. The perspective of "legal realist 
rule scepticism" is that in actual practice, decisions are at the 
mercy of individual judges who make "law" through their 
interpretation of ambiguous and open-ended practices. These 
interpretations reflect social and individual biases and practices, 
and the law is thus distorted from its purpose of neutral 
arbitration in the interests of social justice (Sachs and Wilson 
1978; Atkins and Hogget 1984). This understanding has. been attacked 
from within feminism for reinstating the assumption that bias and 
prejudice are external to the law, that law proceeding from its 
Parliamentary source is just and untainted by the values which 
influence individual judges ( Kingdom 1991; Brown 1991). 
The fixity of meaning required by legal discourse has 
generated a dilemma for feminists which has come to be formulated 
as the Difference-versus-Sameness approach. When "equality before 
the lawn is interpreted as men and women being the same as each 
other, courts do not uphold any legislation intended either to 
compensate for past discrimination or to take into account 
gender-specific differences like maternity. Thus the Sameness 
approach cannot distinguish between "differential treatment that 
disadvantages and differential treatment that advantages" as Kapur 
and Crossman put it (1993:61). Liberal feminists who subscribe to 
the sameness approach however, continue to insist that the only way 
for women to achieve legal recognition of their equal status to men 
is to deny the legal relevance of their difference to the degree 
that it exists. Women should be recognized as gender-neutral legal 
persons. 
The opposing position from within feminism is that this 
accepts the masculine as the norm, and prevents the visibility of 
the unique experience of women. To consider ourselves as gender- 
neutral "persons" can only marginalize us and devalidate 
ourexperience. However, the Difference approach in law has at best 
been protectionist, thus denying women the claim to equality 
altogether. It has also been used by courts to justify 
discriminatory treatment on the grounds that women are different 
from men (Kapur and Crossman 1993; Frug 1992). To put it in Frug's 
words, "Sameness feminists have been thwarted by 'the repeated 
recognition of difference; difference feminists by the devaluing of 
women's difference" (Frug 1992:xv. Emphasis in original). 
In other words, feminists seeking social justice through the 
lab have come up against the limits set by the criterion that law 
be uniform and consistent. It can either recognize sameness (which 
disadvantages women) or difference (which justifies 
discrimination). An alternative approach suggested is that of 
"substantive equality" (Kapur and Crossman 1993:ZO-21). The focus 
of this approach is not on equal treatment under the law, but on 
the impact of the law. This is an attempt to make the law more 
sensitive to a more complex notion of equality which takes into . 
'account the comparative disadvantages of persons under existing 
unequal conditions. Its proponents hold that in some contexts, the 
substantive model will require a sameness approach, in others, a 
corrective approach to take into account difference as well as 
disadvantage . 
This model quite clearly, is an understanding of how the law 
ought to function, and bears out the argument that is central to 
this paper, that rights are constituted within shared moral 
universes. The "substantive equality" approach is an attempt to 
universalise one such moral universe through law. However, both 
conceptually as well as in terms of political practice, this 
approach is illustrative of the problematic nature of the 
discourse of legal rights. It assumes, to begin with, the 
independence and separateness of the judiciary and legal system 
from the institutions of the state and the economic and cultural 
practices which constitute present conditions of inequality. It 
seems to suggest that all that is required is for judges to be 
sensitized to the notion of substantive equality, and social 
conditions will be gradually transformed by law. 
To put one objection to this simply, if the morality 
underlying the notion of substantive equality were so self-evident 
and unthreatening to the dominant social order, we would not need 
the law to bring about social justice. One feminist teacher of law 
and legal activist has come to the conclusion that legal method may 
be "impervious to a feminist perspective" (Mossman 1991: 297) . She 
urges coming to terms with the fact that "... because there is so 
much resistance in legal method itself to ideas which challenge the 
status quo, there is no solution for feminists ... except to 
confront the reality that gender and power are inextricably linked 
in the legal method we use" (1991:298). 
In the context of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms 
of 1982, Judy Fudge makes a similar point. She concludes that once 
the demand for substantive equality for women is translated into 
legal rights, it becomes divorced from broader poltical demands - 
"Instead of directly addressing the question of how best to promote 
women's sexual autonomy under social relations which result in 
women's sexual subordination, feminists who invoke the Charter must 
couch their arguments in terms of the rhetoric of equality rights." 
And courts interpret "equality" as formal equality rather than 
contextualising it within a historical framework of current 
inequalities (Fudge 1989: 49-50) . 
At a conceptual level, the substantive equality model presents 
the problem of privileging rights, which once made legally 
enforceable, acquire a fixity of meaning that can undermine the 
very morality on which they are based. For instance, Kapur and 
Crossman cite the right to own land as a "basic civil and political 
right" in relation to which the sameness approach should be used, 
that, is, gender should be considered irrelevant. It bears repeating 
here that the norms validated by law become relevant and binding in 
all cases in which similar issues are raised. What then, would be 
the implications of using the sameness appr'oach towards the right 
to own land, in the context of land reform legislation? Here gender 
identity would be complicated by class, and the sameness approach 
would disadvantage the weaker party, in this case, the landless. 
Marc Galanter's work (1984) is an acknowledgement of the need 
to confront the tendency of the law to fix meaning. He attempts to 
build into the law a conception of "identity" not as a fixed, 
natural or inherent quality, but as something constituted by 
interaction and negotiation with other components of society. It is 
Galanter's view that this understanding of identity would require 
courts to adopt an "empirical" as opposed to a "formaln approach. 
The latter sees individuals as members of one group only, and 
therefore, as having only the rights which that group is entitled 
to. Thus, for example, one who attains caste status loses tribal 
affiliation as far as the law is concerned. The empirical approach 
on the other hand, does not attempt to resolve the blurring and 
'overlap between categories and accepts multiple affiliations. It 
addresses itself to the particular legislation involved and tries 
to determine which affiliation is acceptable in the particular 
context. Galanter accepts that in this approach, some slippage is 
inevitable between judicial formulations and actual administration, 
for the courts must make subtle distinctions which must be 
translated into workable rules capable of being administered at 
lower levels. 
It is clear that Galanter applies his understanding of 
identity as relative and shifting only to "people", not to "courts" 
or "government". The latter are assumed to be outside this grid of 
affiliations, to have a superior understanding of it, and to be 
capable of choosing the "correct" perspective, whether empirical or 
formal. For example, he writes, "It is beyond the courts to rescue 
these policies (reservation policies) from systematic cognitive 
distortion, for courts cannot control the way that various actors 
and audiences perceive judicial (and other) pronouncements" 
(1984:357). Moreover, government intention in framing and 
implementing reservations is assumed to be identical with the 
official stated intention - that is, promotion of social justice. 
Groups are then seen to relate to these policies in their own 
particularistic ways, while apparently, the government and courts 
have the overall and universal picture. 
Thus, Galanter's attempt to contest law's rigid codifying 
procedures is unsuccessful as he must retain the notion of the 
state and of law itself as the unified and self-transparent agency 
which will interpret the multiplicity of identities around it. 
If as I have attempted to demonstrate, law functions through 
the assertion of certainty and the creation of uniform categories, 
and rights are constituted by particular discourses, this 
resituates rights in a realm of complexity, ambiguity and 
undecidability. We come then, to a point where we must go further 
than saying simply this: the language of rights can be alienating 
and individualistic but since it refers to some desirable 
capacities and powers the oppressed should have, it can be 
empowering. Rather we need to recognize that the experience of 
feminist politics pushes us towards the understanding that social 
movements may have reached the limits of the discourse of rights 
and of "justice" as a metanarrative. That trying to bring about 
positive transformation through the law can in fact run counter to 
the ethics which prompt entry into legal discourse. 
I will now move on to a discussion of the issues of abortion 
and sexual violence in the context of the women's movement in 
India, in the light of the issues raised above. 
Female Foeticide and Feminist Discourse on Abortion 
In India the issue of abortion has been placed on the feminist 
agenda in a manner quite different to its positioning in the West. 
Since the dominant discourses construct poverty as being created by 
over-population, abortion has long been accepted as a measure of 
family-planning. The Medical Termination of Pregnancy (MTP) Act was 
passed in 1971 amidst Parliamentary rhetoric of choice and women's 
rights, but it was clearly intended as a population control 
measure, as several MPs pointed out during the debate on the Bill. 
The Act was not passed as a result of campaigning by women's 
groups, nor did there emerge any concerted anti-abortion stream of 
opinion in the public arena. 
Abortion has become an issue for Indian feminists for quite a 
different reason over the eighties, with the growing practice of 
selective abortion of female foetuses after sex-determination (SD) 
tests during pregnancy. The response from the women's movement has 
been to urge the state to end the practice through law. 
Two crucial questions arise for feminists from the issue, 
debate on which is far from closed within the movement. One, at the 
level of politics, the contradiction involved in pushing for 
legislation which can restrict the access to abortion itself. Two, 
at the level of feminist philosophy, if abortion is a right over 
one's body, how are feminists to deny this right to women when it 
comes to the selective abortion of female foetuses? 
An examination of the history of feminist responses to the 
practice itself as well as to the government's interventions 
illustrates the contradictions and dilemmas involved in negotiating 
these questions. 
The Forum Against Sex Determination and Ser-: Preselection 
(FASDSP) was formed in 1984, and it has been lobbying for 
legislation to,ban the practice. In 1988, the state of Maharashtra 
passed an Act banning prenatal diagnostic practices. The FASDSP, 
a broad forum of feminist and human rights groups, was disappointed 
with the Act because it was full of "loopholes" and had not taken 
on the various recommendations the Forum had made. FASDSP then 
continued its campaign in the form of pressing for Central 
legislation which would be more.effective. Parliament passed the 
Prenata1,Diagnostic Practices (Regulation and Prevention of Misuse) 
Act in 1994, and it awaits Presidential assent. 
Women's groups are dissatisfied with this Act, and in August 
1994 urged the President to send it back for reconsideration to 
Parliament. Some of the points that their memorandum raised are as 
follows (Saheli Newsletter, January 1995:Ll-13)- 
a) All ultrasound machines and other equipment which can be used 
for SD tests should be registered. The Joint Conunittee had earlier 
considered this suggestion and rejected it as unfeasible because 
such equipment is used for various purposes other than pre-natal 
testing. (Report of Joint Committee, 1992:ZO-21). 
b) Future techniques for sex determination as well as for sex pre- 
selection should be brought within the ambit of the Bill. 
c) The Act punishes the woman if it can be proved that she was not 
coerced and that she went in for the test and the abortion of her 
own will. The memorandum says that punishing the woman is 
misguided, even on the presumption that she was coerced unless 
proved otherwise. This is unjust in a context where women rarely 
take autonomous decisions. The Act in this respect is anti-women, 
and would create conditions that would limit its effectiveness. 
It is unlikely that Presidential assent will be with-held, and 
the Bill is expected to be gazetted soon. It is clear that most of 
the loopholes of the Maharashtra Act of 1988, as perceived by 
womens' groups, persist. However, if SD tests are sought to be 
entirely delinked from female foeticide, which is necessary in 
order to protect the MTP Act, they cannot be effectively curbed, 
because most of the equipment is used for other purposes as well. 
Only by closing off all possibilities of "misuse" of existing 
equipment and technology can the practice of female foeticide be 
effectively controlled. But this would mean bringing all abortions 
under legal scrutiny as well. This is the double bind into which, 
I argue, legal discourse pushes social movements like feminism - 
the more narrow the focus of a piece of legislation, the less it 
serves its purpose, and the broader it is, the more it subverts the 
ethics underlying the very demand for legislation. We will find 
similar dynamics at work when the issue of rape/sexual violence is 
explored further on. 
Another important problem arises from the point about women's 
culpability in the memorandum of women's groups to the President. 
It is true that women may be implicated by families being 
prosecuted by the state, although women rarely are in a position to 
make choices. Nevertheless, what are the implications of denying 
agency altogether to women on the grounds that they are never 
responsible for their decisions and therefore, should not be 
considered culpable at all? Within the realm of legal discourse, it 
is dangerous for feminists to construct women as incapable of 
taking autonomous decisions - the consequences for women's 
struggles against legally sanctioned discrimination in other 
spheres .could be fatal . 
The FASDSP1s position is that women who make this choice are 
'constrained by family and social pressures and are not really 
exercising .their free will. This argument leaves unproblematized 
the decisions to abort in all other circumstances - illegitimacy, 
economic constraints and so on: surely these are equally informed 
by social and cultural values? Why is it assumed that only when a 
woman chooses to abort a female foetus is she not acting on her 
"own" will? If we unravel the underlying thread of reasoning which 
makes this position a persuasive one for many feminists, we would 
arrive at an argument which looks like this' : Negative female-to 
male ratios in a population are invariably corelatable to the low 
status of women. So the very constraints of a patriarchal society 
which make abortions necessary in most cases (including the low 
priority given to research on safe contraceptive methods) would be 
much greater if fewer and fewer women were born. Therefore abortion 
must be available to women who want it, while selective abortion of 
female foetuses must be stopped.. 
Clearly "the right to abortion" and the "right to end female 
foeticide" are in a complex interrelationship within feminist 
discourse. "Rights" over one's "own" body then, are not natural, 
timeless and self-evident. They are constituted as legitimate only 
within specific discursive political practices. Social movements 
cannot expect therefore, that rights can be unproblematically 
realised on a terrain where their specificity cannot be retained. 
Further, the FASDSP calls for a ban on all technologies which 
could be used for sex-preselection at the time of conception, and 
for the regulation of all new technologies in future. What does it 
mean for feminist democratic politics to demand legal and 
bureaucratic control over entire areas of science and knowledge? 
Finally, the new legislation and feminist responses to it 
establish that we remain unable to confront the ethics of- 
condoning abortions when they are specifically due to 
"abnormalitiesn in foetuses. The FASDSP is clear that it does not 
want a blanket ban on pre-natal testing, and thus endorses such 
testing for the purpose of detecting "abnormalities" and the 
subsequent abortion of such foetuses (Ravindra R. P. 1990:30). 
However, once we accept there can be a hierarchy of human,beings 
based on physical characteristics, and that it is legitimate to 
withhold the right to be born from those at lower levels of this 
hierarchy, then this reasoning can be extended to other categories, 
whether "females", "inferior races" or others. The work of Rayna 
Rapp and Veena Das points to the recognition that it is not 
inscribed in'the nature of things that a physically or mentally 
retarded individual should have a poor quality of life. It is the 
great value placed on individual autonomy and on competition that 
makes this seem like a self-evident fact ( Rapp 1987, 1993, 1994; 
Das 1986). Neither Das nor Rapp offers facile solutions to the 
dilemmas involved, but their argument foregrounds the moral and 
ethical vision of feminism, with all its rich ambivalence and 
self-doubt, a vision which it would be impossible to straitjacket 
into the certainties of legal discourse. 
Feminist outrage over technologies to control the sex of 
foetuses, and over the practice of the selective abortion of female 
foetuses, arises from the ethical and moral vision of feminsim. 
However, to translate this concern into the language of rights and 
the law appears to threaten this very vision. 
Sexual Violence and Feminism 
There are two simultaneous impulses at work in feminist analyses of 
rape. The one revealing the limitations of the law and its 
inability to encompass the lived experience of women; the other 
seeking to legitimate this experience precisely through having it 
recognized by the law as authentic. 
In other words, 
a)Certain experiences assumed to be clearly recognizable as 
"sexual", are posited as having a reality and an existence prior to 
legal discourse, and the latter is seen as limited and incomplete 
to the extent it is incapable of recognizing these experiences, but 
at the same time 
b)These experiences need to be authenticated by law to have 
social value and be recognized as "realn. To this extent then, they 
- ate to be constituted as real and legitimated by legal discourse. 
What are the iinplications of this, that is, of reinforcing the 
status of Law as the primary legitimating discourse? 
Recourse to the law is seen as necessary and inevitable 
because it is believed that designing a law around an experience 
proves "it matters"; law is "the concrete delivery of rights 
through the legal system" (MacKinnon 1987:103). However, dominant 
modes of constituting the self - as woman, as criminal, as victim 
- are maintained and reinforced through the conventions of legal 
language. The rejection of these categories can come about in fact, 
only through resistance to legal discourse (Bumiller 1991:96). As 
Foucault points out, judgement is passed not only on the "crimes" 
defined by the code, but on "the shadows lurking behind the case" 
- "on passions, instincts, anomalies ..." In short, on the 
deviations from dominant norms (1977:17). Thus, what the law 
legitimates ultimately, is pecisely what feminist practice 
contests. 
Moreover, in post-colonial societies, the establishing of law 
as the only legitimating discourse has meant the marginalizing and 
devalidating of other legitimating discourses. A uniformity was 
imposed which radically transformed indigenous notions of 
ownership, equity and justice. This is not intended as an exercise 
to valorize pre- colonial communitarian values as egalitarian and 
just. On the contrary, "the community" is marked by exclusion along 
the axes of caste, gender, class and so on; inegalitarian power 
relations are the fulcrum on which "the community" turns. 
Nevertheless it would be simplistic to assume the neutrality of the 
modern legal system. Social movements tend to work on the belief 
that even if law is as enmeshed in the power structures of society 
.as "the comunity" is, it can be forced into the service of 
progress and change by the pressure of democratic movements. 
However, as Upendra Baxi points out, underlying the concept of 
"Rule of Law" ( the due observance of the procedures prescribed for 
making a valid decision ) is the idea that power should become 
impersonal and be constrained through rules applied by an 
independent judiciary and autonomous legal profession. But this 
formal legal rationality does not always constrain the arbitrary 
exercise of power; Baxi argues that on the contrary, it often helps 
to camouflage it (Baxi 1982:36-7). 
What does it mean for feminists to insist that this "formal 
legal rationality" should delimit the contours of a particular 
experience, and that it should legitimate this experience? Do we 
not, by implication, accept that without such validation, the 
experience itself has no reality? We need to recognize that legal 
rationality cannot comprehend the complex ways in which sexual 
violence is constituted. 
An analysis of judgements in rape trials which have come up on 
appeal to High Courts and the Supreme Court of India, and of legal 
discourse on rape reveals the impossibility of capturing the 
complexity of what Carol Smart calls the "binary logic" of the law. 
There is no room within legal discourse to conceive of women's 
sexual experience except in terms of consenting/not consenting to 
male pressure. "Consent" itself, a state of mind constituted in a 
complex way, has to be rigidly pegged to a linear notion of 
physical growth if it is to make sense within legal discourse. 
Below the Age of Consent a woman cannot be expected to have agency 
in sexual interaction, she can only be understood as Victim or 
Dupe. Above this age, even if it is by a few months, she is 
radically transformed from Victim to Accomplice. Thus, while 
recognizing the relative powerlessness and lack of autonomy that 
characterise women's relations with men, the point is to question 
the possibility of addressing this experience in the realm of legal 
.discourse. 
Even when justice appears to be done, that is, when conviction 
is secured, the very demonstration through legal discourse of the 
violation of the woman re-enacts and resediments patriarchal and 
z.isogynist values. In' India, feminists have begun to view with 
csncern judgements which take a progressive position on the issue 
of corroborative evidence in rape trials, but based on notions of 
women's "chastity" and "traditions of Indian society". The 
ixplications however, are more serious than feminist critiques tend 
to recognize - it is not simply that in such decisions the court 
ptssively accepts rather than challenges patriarchal values. The 
seriousness lies in recognizing that if it is assumed that 
A -   adit it ion bound Indian society would make "innocent" women 
reluctant to level false accusations of rape, the same factor can 
be expected to motivate "promiscuous" women to hide their 
promiscuity precisely through such accusations. In other words, 
convictions can be secured only at the cost of turning the case 
once more on the axis of the "guilt" or innocence" of the raped 
woman. 
This paradox is what underlies the statement made by a 
feminist lawyer at a workshop in Delhi, that she would rather lose 
a rape case if in the process the:-right kind of debate was made 
possible. But are these two eventualities compatible with each 
ocher? The overwhelming hegemony of the law ensures the synonymity 
of law with justice. If the case were conducted in such a way that 
the "right" issues were raised from a feminist perspective, and 
conviction was not secured, would this not "prove" to society that 
these values are not right but wrong? It would appear to be 
impossible to engage with legal discourse except on its own terms. 
At the heart of any exercise to locate sexual violence within the 
law lies the irresolveable conflict involved in defining the harm 
of sexual violence so exactly that legal discourse can comprehend 
it, and so retaining ambivalences that the ethical impulse of 
feminism is undamaged. 
Disembodying the Self 
We have so far assumed as "natural" the symbolic order which. 
produces this identity, which inscribes the body as body, as 
separate from other bodies, as healthy/unhealthy and so on, and 
which constructs the gendered and heterosexual body as the norm. 
Can we begin to conceive of a feminist politics which radically 
contests the production of this identity ? 
It is useful to consider here Judith Butler's discussion of 
Freud's The Ego and the Id (1923) in which Freud argues that the 
body does not precede and give birth to the idea of the body but 
rather it is the idea that makes the body accessible as a body. If 
we work on the belief that it is the idea that makes the body 
phenomenologically accessible, feminist practice would be liberated 
from the stranglehold of the discourse that designates the body as 
the site of selfhood. The boundaries of the stable, gendered, 
heterosexual self would be seen to be cultural and historical 
constructs, and not the natural immutable "reality" that we are 
apparently irrevocably faced with. 
What can this mean for us in our very real struggle against 
constant dehumanisation and humiliation through our reduction to 
our bodies? The discussion in this paper seems to point to the 
tentative recognition that the possibility of realising the 
emancipatory impulse of feminism lies, not in concretizing and more 
fully defining the boundaries of "our bodies" through law, but in 
accepting "the self" as something that is negotiable and 
contestable. The indeterminacy of identity need not lead to 
political paralysis - on the contrary, it could dislocate feminist 
practice productively, from sterile engagement with legal discourse 
and hegemonic cultural productions of selfhood, to a realm of 
radical doubt and constant negotiation of what constitutes "me" as 
a "woman" in some contexts. Emancipation itself must be recognized 
as disaggregated, split along different axes, just as identity is 
not just a positive conglomerate of different subject positions, 
but an ever- temporary construction, forming anew at the 
intersections cf shifting subject positions. 
It might be possible then to see the feminisc project, not as . 
one of "justice" but of "emancipation". It is a characteristic of 
the discourse of justice that it has to operate on the same terrain 
as the harm it seeks to redress. The key terms upon which the 
injustice rests are not problematized, rather, these are in fact 
legitimised by showing that in the particular case in question, 
they are interpreted inadequately or non-inclusively. 
The term "body" is one such key category in the issues we hhve 
discussed. In the case of sexual violence, it is assumed by all the 
discourses that circulate around and produce "sexual violence" as 
a category (including feminist discourses), that the body of woman 
is rapable. Women can always be raped, and rape is an attack on the 
very self-hood of woman. The issue then becomes one of "proving" 
that rape did in fact take place, and ensuring justice through 
securing conviction by law. This leaves the ever-open possibility 
of other (all) women continuing to get raped. 
Similarly, with female foeticide and its relationship to 
"women's rights over their bodies", we have seen how it becomes 
necessary to destabilise given notions of "bodies" and "women" to 
understand apparently contradictory positions taken by feminism. 
Could it be that the way out of this dilemma too, requires a' 
relocation of "selfhood" outside the body? 
What if our struggle were to emancipate ourselves from the 
very meaning of "rape" and "abortion" - indeed, of hegemonic 
conceptions of what it means to "be a womann ? Does the ever- 
present threat of sexual violence and of other gendered violence 
(directed at women whether born or unborn), flow from the locating 
of the "female" self inside the sexually defined body of woman? 
The attempt then should be to redraw the map of our body to make it 
accessible to new codes, to new senses of the self, so that at 
least some of these selves would be free of the limits set by the 
body. 
NOTES 
(1) CLS scholars include Roberto Unger (1983) , Michael Sandel 
(1982), Peter Gabel and Paul Harris (1982-3).For a feminist 
critique of the CLS position on the family,see Susan Moller Okin 
(1993:Chapter 6 )  . 
(2)Tahir Mahmood (1965) argues that custom is not an indep&ndent 
source of law in the legal theory of Islam. He claims that British 
administrators misunderstood custom to have the same significance 
as within Hindu law. The references to "usages" may have been 
inspired, according to him, by the practices of Hindu converts to 
Islam, who continued to follow certain aspects of Hindu law and 
custom. But if this was prevalent, then to what extent did a pure 
Quoranic law operate for Muslims any more than Sastric law did for 
Hindus? It was only at the beginning of the Twentieth century that 
the ulema began to compulsorily enforce Shari'a law. 


